


























All correspondence to: 
 
Associate Professor Andrew C Worthington 
Editor, Discussion Papers in Economic, Finance and 
International Competitiveness 
School of Economics and Finance 
Queensland University of Technology 
GPO Box 2434, BRISBANE QLD 4001, Australia 
 
Telephone:  61 7 3864 2658 





DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS, FINANCE 




Co-operation versus Non Co-operation in 










Series edited by 
Associate Professor Andrew C Worthington 
 
School of Economics and Finance RECENT DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
Worthington, A, Kay-Spratley, A & Higgs, H, Transmission of Prices and Price 
Volatility in Australian Electricity Spot Markets:  A multivariate GARCH Analysis, 
No 114, July 2002 
 
Hernandez, J & Layton, A, The Regional Appropriateness of Monetary Policy:  An 
Application of Taylor’s Rule to Australian States and Territories, No 115, August 
2002 
 
Taing, S H & Worthington, A, Co-movements Among European Equity Sectors:  
Selected Evidence from the Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Financial, 
Industrial and Materials Sectors, No 116, September 2002 
 
Goffey, K & Worthington, A, Motor Vehicle Usage Patterns in Australia:  A 
Comparative Analysis of Driver, Vehicle & Purpose Characteristics for household & 
Freight Travel, No 117, September 2002 
 
Lahiri, R, On Optimal monetary Policy in a Liquidity Effect Model, No 118, 
October 2002 
 
Valadkhani, A, Identifying Australia’s High Employment Generating Industries, No 
119, October 2002 
 
Valadkhani, A, Modelling Demand for Broad Money in Australia, No 120, 
December 2002 
 
Worthington, A & Higgs, H, The Relationship Between Energy Spot and Futures 
Prices:  Evidence from the Australian Electricity Market, No 121, November 2002 
 
Li, S, A Valuation Model for Firms with Stochastic Earnings, No 122, November 
2002 
 
Higgs, H & Worthington, A, Tests of the Random Walk Hypothesis for Australian 
Electricity Spot Prices:  An Application Employing Multiple Variance Ratio Tests, 
No 123, November 2002 
 
Robinson, M, Best Practice in Performance Budgeting, No 124, November 2002 
 
Lee, B, “Output and Productivity Comparisons of the Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Sector:  US and Australia, 1991 to 1999”, No 125, November 2002 
 
Drew, M E, & Stanford, J D, Risk Superannuation Management in Australia: Risk, 
Cost and Alpha, No. 126, January 2003 
 
Drew, M E, & Stanford, J D, A Review of Australia's Compulsory Superannuation 
Scheme after a Decade, No. 127, January 2003 
 
Drew, M E, & Naughton, T, & Veerarghavan, M, Asset Pricing in China: Evidence 
from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, No. 128, January 2003 
 
Clements, A, & Drew, M E, Investor Expectations and Systematic Risk, No. 129, 
January 2003 
 
Drew, M, Superannuation Funds: The Fees and Performance Debate, No. 130, 
January 2003 
 
Valadkhani, A, History of Macroeconomic Modelling: Lessons from Past 
Experience, No. 131, January 2003 
 
Valadkhani, A, Long and Short-Run Determinants of Money Demand in New 
Zealand: Evidence from CoIntegration Analysis, No. 132, January 2003 
 
Anderson, J, Optimal f and Portfolio Return Optimisation in US Futures Markets, 
No. 133, January 2003 
 
Anderson J, A Test of Weak-Form Market Efficiency in Australia Bank Bill Futures 
Calendar Spreads, No. 134, January 2003 
 
Aruman, S, The Effectiveness of Foreign Exchange Intervention in Australia:  A 
Factor Model Approach with GARCH Specifications, No 135, January 2003 
 
Lahiri, R, A Further Exploration of Some Computational Issues in Equilibrium 
Business Cycle Theory, No 136, February 2003 
 
Valadkhani, A, How Many Jobs Were Lost With the Collapse of Ansett? , No. 137, 
February 2003 
 
Drew, M E, Naughton, T, & Veerarghavan, M, Is Idiosyncratic Volatility Priced? 
Evidence from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, No. 138, February 2003 
 
Valadkhani, A, Does the Term Structure Predict Australia's Future Output Growth? 
No. 139, February 2003 
 
Worthington, A, & Higgs, H, A Multivariate GARCH analysis of the Domestic 
Transmission of Energy Commodity Prices and Volatility:  A comparison of the 
Peak and Off-peak Periods in the Australian Electricity Spot Market, No. 140, 
February 2003 
 Li, S, The Estimation of Implied Volatility from the Black-Scholes Model:  Some 
New Formulas and Their Applications, No. 141, February 2003 
Drew, M E, & Stanford, J D, Principal and Agent Problems in Superannuation 
Funds, No. 142, March 2003 
 
Li, S, A Single-Period Model and Some Empirical Evidences for Optimal Asset 
Allocation with Value-at-Risk Constraints, No. 143, March 2003 
 
Valadkhani, A, An Empirical Analysis of the Black Market Exchange Rate in Iran, 
No. 144, April 2003 
 
Worthington, A, Business Expectations and Preferences regarding the Introduction 
of Daylight Saving in Queensland, No. 145, May 2003 
 
Worthington, A, Losing Sleep at the Market: An Empirical Note on the Daylight 
Saving Anomaly in Australia, No. 146, May 2003 
 
Robinson, M, Tightening the Results/Funding Link in Performance Budgeting 
Systems, No. 147, May 2003 
 
Worthington, A & Higgs, H, Risk, Return and Portfolio Diversification in Major 
Painting Marketing: The Application of Conventional Financial Analysis to 
Unconventional Investments, No. 148, June 2003 
 
Valadkhani A, Demand for M2 in Developing Countries: An Empirical Panel 
Investigation, No. 149, July 2003 
 
Worthington A, & Higgs H, Modelling the Intraday Return Volatility Process in the 
Australia Equity Market:  An Examination of the Role of Information Arrival in S & 
PASX Stocks, No 150, July 2003 
 
Lahiri R, Tax Distortions in a Neoclassical Monetary Economy in the Presence of 
Administration Costs, No 151 September 2003 
 
Layton A, & Smith D, Duration Dependence in the US Business Cycle, No 152, 
August 2003 
 
Valadkhani A & Layton A, Quantifying the Effect of GST on Inflation in Australia’s 
Capital Cities: An Intervention Analysis, No 153, September 2003 
 
Worthington A, & Valadkhani A, Measuring the Impact of Natural Disasters on 
Capital Markets:  An Empirical Application Using Intervention Analysis, No 154, 
September 2003 
 
Robinson M, The Output Concept and Public Sector Services, No 155, September 
2003 
 
Worthington A, Brown K, Crawford M, & Pickernell D, Socio-Economic and 
Demographic Determinants of Household Gambling in Australia, No 156, 
September 2003 
 
Worthington A, & Higgs H, Tests of Random Walks and Market Efficiency in Latin 
American Stock Markets: An Empirical Note, No 157, September 2003 
 
(Replacing Previous No 158) Worthington A, & Higgs H, Systematic Features of 
High-Frequency Volatility in Australian Electricity Markets: Intraday Patterns, 
Information Arrival and Calendar Effects, No 158, November 2003 
 
Worthington A, & Higgs H, Weak-form Market Efficiency in European Emerging 
and Developed Stock Markets, No 159, September 2003 
 
West T, & Worthington A, Macroeconomic Risk Factors in Australian Commercial 
Real Estate, Listed Property Trust and Property Sector Stock Returns: A 
Comparative Analysis using GARCH-M, No 160, October 2003 
 
Lee, B, Interstate Comparison of Output and Productivity in the Australian 
Agricultural Sector – 1991 – 1999, No 161, October 2003 
 
McCarthy S, Hedging Versus not Hedging: Strategies for Managing Foreign 
Exchange Transaction Exposure, No 162, November 2003 
 
Worthington, A, Emergency Finance in Australian Households: 
An Empirical Analysis of Capacity and Sources, No 163, November 2003 
 
Worthington, C, Debt as a Source of Financial Stress in Australian Households, No 
164, November 2003  
  
The Australian Budgeting System: 









Australia in the late 1990 adopted a purchaser-provider model of performance budgeting – so-called 
“accrual output budgeting” – which attracted considerable international interest.  By 2003, however, the 
system was in headlong retreat.  This paper examines the key difficulties experienced by this system, and 
links these to the system changes now being made.  It speculates on the possible future of performance 
budgeting in Australia.  It draws on extensive interviews and examination of budgetary process 
documentation in a number of Australian jurisdictions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1990s, the Australian national government (the ‘Commonwealth’) and most state governments 
adopted a budgetary system known generically as accrual output budgeting (AOB).  The system drew its 
inspiration from the similar budgeting system introduced in New Zealand in the mid-1990s (Schick, 
1996).  AOB aimed to transform public budgeting across the board into a process whereby government 
‘purchases’ outputs from its agencies, on a basis which emulates the functioning of competitive markets.  
In this purchaser-provider relationship, agencies were to operate like independent businesses.   
Government would act as a ‘demanding’ purchaser, striking hard bargains with its agencies.  Requiring 
agencies to operate like independent businesses would, it was thought, create a “new competitive world” 
(Boxall, 1998) by placing government-owned agencies and potential private suppliers of publicly-
financed services on an equal competitive footing.  It was expected that agencies would, as a 
consequence, experience unprecedented pressure to improve productive efficiency. AOB completely overhauled the parliamentary budget appropriations mechanism, introducing a ‘payment 
for outputs’ appropriation.  In principle, the magnitude of each agency’s payment for outputs 
appropriation would be determined by the planned quantity of agency outputs (of specified quality) and 
the per-unit ‘prices’ of each type of output
1.  The shopping list of outputs to be delivered during the year 
would be stipulated during the budget process, and would be outlined either in the annual budget papers 
and/or in contracts (called ‘purchasing agreements’ at the national government level) between the 
government and the agency. 
 
Consistent with the ‘market’ model driving AOB, budget-dependent agencies were for the first time 
required to produce full business-style statements of financial performance reporting their operating result 
(i.e. profit or loss) for the year.  In this business-style financial reporting, the ‘payment for outputs’ 
received by an agency would be treated as ‘revenue’, and the operating result would then be equal to the 
difference between this revenue and the costs of producing outputs.  Thus if an output “costs exceed 
funding, agencies incur an operating deficit” (Queensland Treasury, 1998: 12). 
 
It was anticipated that the distinction between revenue and costs would become a crucial pillar of the 
AOB system, just as it is fundamental to the market mechanism.  This would not happen immediately, 
because in the initial implementation phase of AOB the unit prices paid for outputs would, for reasons of 
practicality, be based upon their cost.  However, it was intended that there would be a rapid transition to a 
position where output prices would be set on the basis of what might be called the efficient cost of 
production, which would be measured by cost benchmarking or by market price references.  As the 
Commonwealth Finance department (henceforth ‘Finance’) put it: “departmental output appropriations 
will progressively be based on market (or benchmark) prices, rather than accrual based input costs” 
(DOFA, 1999: 27).  This would mean that if an agency’s actual cost of production exceeded the 
‘efficient’ cost, it would run an operating deficit the magnitude of which would be indicative of the extent 
of its productive inefficiency.  This approach represented an attempt to emulate the efficiency discipline  
 
imposed by a competitive market, in which market price does not necessarily cover the cost of production 
and competition over time drives prices down to minimum average cost. 
 
The importance of the distinction between revenue and costs would be further reinforced by the intended 
introduction of what might be called ‘payment for results’.  This meant that agencies would only be 
permitted to recognize their budgeted payment for outputs appropriation as ‘revenue’ in their financial 
statements – and perhaps only receive the funds – when and to the extent that they actually delivered 
outputs.  The Victorian government early on set up a mechanism of delivery ‘invoicing’ in an attempt to 
put this principle into practice (VDTF, 1998: 302-3; Robinson, 2002a).  When introducing AOB, the 
Commonwealth Finance department announced its intention also to move to position where “recognition 
of Departmental output appropriations” would “reflect agencies [sic] delivery of their outputs” (DOFA, 
1999, p 43). 
 
The purchase-provider model also led to the introduction of an entirely new distinction between agency 
outputs and administered expenses.  The former referred to services or goods the delivery of which the 
agency controlled
2 and for which it and its minister could therefore be held accountable.  The latter 
covered items where the agency was required to make payments but had no management control over any 
services involved.  Judges’ salaries paid out of the budget of an Attorney-General’s department are an 
example of an administered expense, since under the principle of separation of powers, neither 
departmental officials nor the relevant minister exert management control over judges’ performance.   
Under AOB, agency outputs are covered by the ‘payment for outputs’, and there is an entirely separate 
budgetary appropriation for administered expenses.  Agencies are also required to produce separate 
financial statements for these two categories of expenses.  The intention of these arrangements was to 
intensify performance pressure in relation to those services the quantity and quality of which were within 
the control of agencies and their ministers (i.e. the agency outputs). 
 Although often justified by proponents on the basis of accrual accounting principles, other features of the 
AOB financial reporting and appropriations arrangements can only be understood by reference to the 
market model.  The budgetary ‘payment for outputs’ appropriation is based upon the full accrual 
costs/price of producing outputs.  The most remarkable implication of this is that agencies receive in their 
‘current’ budget allocations funds to ‘cover’ depreciation on their assets.  This practices arises from the 
conceptualization of the payment for outputs appropriation as the ‘prices’ paid for outputs – after all, 
businesses aim to recover all of their costs of production in the prices they set.  The ‘funded’ depreciation 
then becomes the basis for complicated capital budgeting arrangements which are also intended to 
emulate business practice.  Agencies set aside their depreciation funding as an accumulating pool of 
internal funding for capital expenditure which, in principle, enables them to maintain and replace their 
existing capital stock.  Armed with this major ‘internal’ source of capital funding, they only need 
additional explicit capital funding if they need to increase their capital stock.  Such additional capital 
funding is provided, when and if necessary, through an ‘equity injection and loan’ budget appropriation.  
Consequently, the pre-AOB budgetary capital appropriation – which had provided the authorization off 
almost all of agencies’ capital expenditure – disappeared.  The model behind this new capital budgeting 
arrangement was one of a private sector business which would finance part of its capital expenditure 
internally from retained earnings, and part by recourse to the external capital markets. 
 
Another key ‘market’ element of the new budgeting arrangements was the introduction in many AOB 
jurisdictions of capital charging.  This involved an annual charge upon agencies set as a percentage (12 
percent in the case of the Commonwealth) of their net assets.  Conceptually, this was supposed to be the 
equivalent of the normal profit margin – the ‘opportunity cost of capital’ – that efficient private sector 
firms could be expected to earn.  The capital charge was intended simultaneously to ensure that outputs 
reflected all economic costs, and to ensure better investment and asset management decision-making by 
ensuring that agencies did not regard capital as a ‘free’ resource.  
 
When interacting with agencies over equity injections, capital charging and the monitoring of agency 
financial results, the political executive/finance ministry was considered to be acting in an ‘ownership’ 
(shareholder) capacity.  The dichotomisation of government-agency relationship into those of a 
purchaser-provider nature and those of an ownership nature was an explicit feature of AOB doctrine. 
 
AOB clearly represented a revolution in Australian public budgeting – a revolution which was, moreover, 
implemented with a great sense of urgency.  Revolutions usually arise as a result of the breakdown of the 
ancien régime, yet this was certainly not the case in respect to the pre-AOB Australian public budgeting 
system.  From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the Australian government had been an international leader in 
well-considered public budgeting reforms.  The outstanding achievement of these reforms was to create a 
highly-effective medium-term expenditure framework capable of delivering major reallocations of 




AOB shifted the focus of budget reform from allocative efficiency (expenditure priority setting) to 
productive efficiency (production of services at minimum cost), in the belief that there was massive scope 
for efficiency gains in public service provision.  This emphasis upon improving productive efficiency is 
not unique to AOB, but is a widespread feature of performance budgeting systems which have emerged 
internationally over the past decade or so. 
 
AOB is not unique in the conviction that, in its pursuit of improved efficiency, the public sector needs to 
draw substantially on good private sector practice – this is, of course, a key element of the so-called New 
Public Management.  What was distinctive about AOB is how extremely closely it sought to emulate the 
‘market’ (or at least a textbook version thereof) and to re-model budget-dependent government agencies 
in the business image. 
 As in New Zealand, the adoption of AOB in Australia was led by bureaucrats (not, incidentally, by 
politicians
4) who had an extraordinarily expansive view of the potential role which market-type 
mechanisms could and should play in social organization, and who tended to be highly dismissive of the 
proposition that there are significant fundamental differences between public and private sectors.  Their 
outlook went far beyond being merely ‘pro-market’. 
 
What follows in this paper is, firstly, a review of key difficulties experienced by the AOB systems and, 
secondly, an outline of recent changes which represent a retreat from the AOB philosophy.  There is, 
throughout, particular focus on experience at the national government level.  The discussion is informed 
partly by extensive interviews carried out with relevant senior government officials in the mid-2003
5. 
 
THE AOB EXPERIENCE: PURCHASER-PROVIDER 
AOB represented a noble attempt to create an environment in which agencies would be compelled to 
dramatically improve efficiency.  Regrettably, the system was conceptually flawed, and the most 
fundamental flaw lay in the purchaser-provider model.  AOB assumed that an output-based version of the 
purchaser-provider principle – what might be called ‘output-purchase budgeting’ – was a model suitable 
for general application to tax-financed services.  Unfortunately, this is a mistaken belief.  There are a 
great many services for which this approach to budgeting is unworkable or impracticable, for reasons 
which have been discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g. Robinson, 2002b, 2002c).  These are, in summary: 
   
•  Output heterogeneity: this describes services which are characterized by considerable deliberate 
tailoring in the set of activities delivered to clients/cases in response to differences in client/case 
characteristics.  Output heterogeneity can introduce substantial and unpredictable indeterminacy into 
the average cost of  outputs,  
 
•  Contingent capacity services: exemplified by emergency services and the military, these are services 
government needs to maintain a significant level of service-delivery capacity, quite independent of 
the level of service actually being delivered, 
•  Many government services are characterized by significant uncertainty concerning the type of output 
the agency should be delivering, arising either from uncertainty as to the most effective means of 
achieving a clearly-defined outcome, or from the uncertain or contested nature of the desired 
outcome itself (Tankersley and Grizzle, 1994).  Output-purchase budgeting in this context can lead 
to a single-minded focus upon efficiency, at the expense of improved effectiveness through strategy 
changes, 
•  Many government services which face unpredictable demand fluctuations deal with this at least in 
part by rationing the level of activity per case/client, which is inconsistent with the idea of paying a 
pre-specified unit price for outputs of pre-defined quality. 
 
Perhaps the most aggressive attempt to implement output-purchase budgeting in an Australian jurisdiction 
was at the national level.  An “output pricing review” process was initiated, under which the Finance set 
out to conduct intensive reviews of every portfolio budget over a period of a couple of years in order to 
determine the appropriate ‘prices’ it would ‘pay’ for departmental outputs.  Closely linked to this, Finance 
sought very quickly after the adoption of AOB to implement formularized output funding arrangements, 
particularly through formal ‘purchasing agreements’ between Finance and agencies.  In the process, 
however, it became clear that there were many services for which formularized funding based upon unit 
‘prices’ was extraordinarily difficult to implement.  As a result, actual formularized funding arrangements 
were only ever introduced for a relatively small sub-set of the services delivered by the Commonwealth 
government.  Even then, major difficulties arose. 
 
The experience of the Australian immigration department – an agency which produces more services 
apparently suited to formularized output funding than most other national government agencies – exemplified some of these difficulties.  There was an interim purchasing agreement between Finance and 
Immigration in 1999-2000, and by 2001 this had developed into a three-year agreement covering 2001-
04
6.  The Immigration purchasing agreement contained formularized funding for a wide range of 
departmental services.  It set, for example, unit ‘prices’ for each of 14 different categories of visa 
application.  There were three different categories of ‘removals’ of illegal immigrants – i.e. the 
management of forced repatriations – each of which attracted a different unit price.  Yet another type of 
output subject to this funding arrangement was the detention, under Australia’s mandatory detention 
policies, of illegal immigrants.  Here the aim of the purchasing agreement in its initial iteration was to 
provide automatic formularized funding to cope with unpredictable additional arrivals – at a time when 
large numbers of ‘boat people’ were arriving on Australia’s coasts.  In other words, formularized output 
funding arrangements were being used not only to drive efficiency improvements, but also to improved 
budget flexibility. 
 
Even though the purchasing agreement only covered those Immigration services which appeared more 
suited to the purchaser-provider treatment, the problem of heterogeneity still manifested itself.  To take 
just one example, one of the 14 visa output categories used for funding purposes covered a number of 
complex types of visa application including spouse visa applications – that is, applications for entry status 
by persons on the grounds of marriage to an Australian citizen.  (Immigration’s mandate in respect to 
such applications is to prevent abuse of spousal entry through contrived marriages contracted solely for 
immigration purposes.)  It became clear, however, that there is such great variability in the extent of 
investigative activity which spouse visa applications require as to make this particular type of visa 
application entirely unsuited to funding via a fixed per-case amount.  Immigration might, for example, be 
faced in a given year with a set of spouse visa applications of more than usual average complexity, in 
which case it would find itself under considerable financial pressure to investigate cases with less than 
adequate thoroughness.  
  
 
The automatic funding for mandatory detention also came, paradoxically, to be seen as a problem by 
many of those who had initially championed it.  They came to feel that the surge in ‘boat people’ arrivals 
required a radical change of policies in the direction of deterrence, and that formularized funding had the 
undesirable effect of reducing the pressure on Immigration to undertake the policy re-think needed.  This 
illustrates the problems which can arise in output-purchase funding systems when there is uncertainty 
about the nature of the outputs the agency should be delivering.   
 
As mentioned earlier, a key AOB aspiration was the adoption of the principle of ‘payment for results’.  
However, if the “recognition of appropriation revenues” were to “be tied to output acquittal 
performance”
7, then it would be necessary to be able to objectively measure output delivery performance.  
For many services, this was very difficult to do, because of the well-known difficulties of performance 
measurement in the public sector.  At the Commonwealth level, this difficulty led to extensive interaction 
between Finance – which was initially keen to apply to principle of ‘payment for results’ widely – and the 
Auditor-General.  The latter was concerned that revenue recognition based upon highly subjective 
assessments of output delivery performance would create wide scope for the manipulation of agency 
accounts.  In this debate, the Auditor-General was in a strong position because of his much-feared power 
to qualify agency accounts, and Finance was obliged to largely give way.  The outcome was a general 
principle that budgetary outputs appropriations would be recognized as revenue at the time the 
appropriations legislation becomes law, unless there is a purchasing agreement or something similar 
which would clearly state how output delivery performance would be measured (DOFA, 2002: 20; 
ANAO, 2002: 24-25).  The other jurisdiction which made a serious effort to implement the principle of 
‘payment for results’, Victoria, experienced its own very considerable practical difficulties, which have 
been discussed elsewhere (Robinson, 2002a: 89). 
 
In the light of the above analysis, it may perhaps appear strange that the Commonwealth did not accept 
the “purchaser-provider” label for its AOB system (DOFA, 2001).  After all the system’s essence was, in the words of the head of the Finance Department, that “the Government will know what [outputs] it is 
being offered and at what prices …[and] can then actively decide what it wants to buy and how much it 
wants to pay” (Boxall, 1998).  The most plausible interpretation is, perhaps, one which relates to the 
nature of the interaction between the center (the Cabinet and finance ministry) and line agencies in 
determining which outputs the government would purchase.  A criticism leveled at AOB was that it 
assumed that the center was potentially capable of detailed decisions about the whole shopping list of 
outputs that it wished to purchase from agencies, and that this ignored the wealth of budgeting experience 
which gave the lied to the illusion of ‘comprehensively rational’ centralized expenditure decision-
making
8.  This allegation was not without some justification, and was encouraged by the careless 
language used in some of the official AOB literature
9.  However, AOB proponents were not unaware of 
the informational limitations facing the center.  In their view, AOB did not require the center to specify 
the whole menu of outputs to be delivered.  It was the task of agencies to recommend what should be 
produced, and the center’s prerogative to modify detailed agency output proposal when and to the extent 
that it wished.  It would appear that this disavowal of extreme allocative centralization was what Finance 
had in mind when it rejected the “purchaser-provider” label. 
 
Nevertheless, the difficulties encountered in the Commonwealth-level output pricing reviews and 
purchasing agreements pointed to a different type of informational constraint facing central budget 
decision-makers.  AOB required finance ministries to determine the efficient cost of production of each of 
the myriad of outputs produced by budget sector agencies.  This would have required a monumental effort 
even if the necessary analytic techniques had been available.  However, the AOB enthusiasm for the use 
of market price comparisons and benchmarking overlooked the considerable limitations upon the 
practicability of those techniques.  Benchmarking can be a most valuable management tool for services 
where good benchmarking partners are available.  However, there are many areas of government where it 
is very difficult or even impossible to find other organizations sufficiently similar to permit cost-effective 
benchmarking. Moreover, even where benchmarking is feasible, it remains a costly and demanding  
 
process.  As for market price comparators, these tend to be available for a very small minority of 
government outputs. 
 
It is therefore not surprising that the Commonwealth output pricing review process turned out to be not 
only exhausting, but also ultimately unsatisfactory, to both Finance and the line agencies concerned.  
Output pricing reviews which were intended to be accomplished in one year extended to two and 
sometimes three years.  Even then, it turned out to be frustratingly difficult to draw strong conclusions 
either about the scope for efficiency gains or priority-setting issues.  Benchmarking to determine efficient 
cost proved to be very difficult
10. 
 
The failure of the AOB strategy of detailed central review of expenditure efficiency across government is 
somewhat reminiscent of the earlier failures to recognize the informational constraints upon central 
budget decision-makers.  Where AOB did most seriously underestimate the informational constraints on 
the center was, instead, in respect to the output ‘price-setting’ process – in other words, in respect to the 
central review of productive efficiency. 
 
Another fundamental related weakness of the AOB model lay in the conceptualization of agencies as 
quasi-independent businesses.  Even if one is operating – as is the case in Australia – in an administrative 
environment characterized by large ‘super-ministries’, there are many areas where inter-agency policy 
and service delivery co-ordination are crucially important.  An ideology which encourages agencies to 
view themselves as stand-alone entities discourages and undermines such co-ordination.  If one were 
looking for a business analogy, government agencies would be far better compared with divisions of a 
large firm than with stand-alone enterprises. 
 
 
 THE AOB EXPERIENCE: FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CONTROL 
One of the results of AOB has been to attract great hostility to ‘accrual accounting’ amongst public 
servants who are not accountants.  Even amongst senior agency financial management executives, there is 
a notable minority who are quite anti-accruals. 
 
Concretely, some key Commonwealth agency financial personnel express the view that the AOB 
“accrual” budgeting has “distracted” serious budget decision-making at the ministerial and cabinet levels, 
because it is often necessary to “de-actualize” budget estimates to facilitate decision-making.  The 
greatest problem in this respect has, it is said, been the requirement for agency to present budget estimates 
and bids which include depreciation. 
 
The difficulty with ‘budgeting’ for depreciation is, of course, that depreciation is an expense arising from 
expenditure which has already been undertaken.  It is therefore essentially irrelevant to decisions about 
agency budget allocations the principle focus of which should be upon whether to incur expenses which 
involve present or future expenditure.  Although the adoption of ‘full’ accrual accounting for financial 
reporting purposes does require the recognition of depreciation as an expense in agency accounts, this 
does not in any way imply a need to include depreciation in agency budget allocations.  Indeed, most 
other nations which have adopted full accrual accounting into the general government sector have not 
adopted the pretence of budgeting for depreciation.  They recognize that financial reporting and budgeting 
are two different things. 
 
‘Funded’ depreciation is, as noted earlier, also one aspect of quite distinctive AOB capital budgeting 
arrangements.  It is accumulated to serve as an ‘internal’ source of capital funding, supplemented when 
necessary with the new ‘equity injections’ capital appropriation.  The problem with these arrangements is 
that they are essentially fictional
11.  Once again, moreover, they are arrangements which are not ‘accrual’ 
in nature, but which arise from the AOB business model.  There is no reason why the move to accrual  
 
accounting could not have be accompanied with the retention of the pre-AOB appropriation arrangements 
under which each agency received an annual capital appropriation which, approximately speaking, 
covered all of its capital expenditure. 
 
Turning to financial reporting, the AOB practice of treating budget output funding as ‘revenue’, with the 
consequent derivation of an operating results (profit/loss) measure, is one which differs fundamentally 
from the traditional view – still held by the vast majority of governments throughout the world – that 
budget funds provided to departments cannot be regarded as departmental revenue because they are 
generally not, in any meaningful sense, raised or earned by those departments.  From this perspective, 
measures of departmental profit or loss are meaningless.  Departments are by their very nature 'loss'-
making.  The AOB approach to financial reporting has certainly attracted criticism in Australia.  At the 
time of the 2003-04 Commonwealth budget, for example, one of Australia’s leading financial journalists 
made great sport of the fact that the Defense Department was forecasting an operating surplus which 
would make it the most profitable enterprise in the country.  This, he opined, was “lunatic”, because “the 
armed services do not earn a cent.  They are a cost center”
12.  He was quite right. 
 
Once again, however, there is nothing in accrual accounting per se which requires the mythical 
characterization of government budget funding as ‘revenue’, or the treatment of a cost center as if it were 
a profit center.  These are not, for example, elements of the full accrual financial reporting model 
introduced into British general government under the label of ‘resource accounting’, under which what is 
reported is the total ‘consumption of resources’ (i.e. the accrual cost of services). 
 
One unfortunate consequence of the Australian adoption of an inappropriate business-style model of 
accrual financial reporting has been that agencies are now obliged to comply with highly complicated 
private-sector style accounting standards which make agency financial reports largely incomprehensible 
to lay persons (including politicians).  In the private sector, tight and complex codes governing financial reporting are necessary because of the fundamental significance of the profit measure in the business 
world.  The same considerations do not apply to budget-sector government agencies.   
 
It also worth noting that the AOB distinction in appropriations between ‘controlled’ and ‘administered’ 
expenses has proved in practice to be a difficult and confusing one, however simple it may sound in 
theory.  In the public sector, the degree of control exercised, and responsibility for, services, is often a 
matter of degree.  As a result, practice on the classification of expenses as either controlled or 
administered has been very far from consistent between different jurisdictions. 
 
THE RETREAT 
By 2003, there is a widespread view within the bureaucracy in Australia that AOB had not been a success.  
There was also, according to senior officials, considerable ministerial dissatisfaction with the system.  As 
a result of this, Australian public sector budgeting is now in a state of flux.  A major re-think has started 
within the Commonwealth Department of Finance
13.  Part of this was the conduct during 2002 of a 
Budget Estimates and Framework Review, which lead to some significant initial changes in the system.  
Some of the State Treasuries have also been actively reconsidering their position. 
 
The most striking change has been the dismantling of the purchaser-provider elements of the system, 
which are now widely regarded as (in the words of one senior agency financial executive interviewed) an 
“ideology-driven management fad”.  At the Commonwealth level, for example, the output pricing review 
process has been formally dropped as the result of a Budget Estimates and Framework Review 
recommendation that as of 1 July 2003 these reviews be “rolled into a broader input-based cost analysis 
model involving a detailed analysis of agency expenditure”.  Benchmarking has essentially disappeared as 
an element of the central budget process.  The ‘purchasing agreements’ and most other formularized 
output funding arrangements between Finance and agencies – including the much-vaunted agreement 
with Immigration – have also disappeared.  
 
The view that AOB placed too much emphasis upon outputs at the expense of outcomes had come to be 
quite widely held, even within Treasuries and Finance ministries.  Representative of the current mood is 
the decision of the Western Australian Treasury that the “main focus” of its version of AOB system – 
known as Output Based Management (OBM) “will shift from outputs to outcomes”, and their 
contemplation of a possible name change of OBM to “outcome based management”
14. 
 
The notion of agencies as independent businesses has also lost currency.  Across the country, one now 
hears talk about ‘joined-up government’ (a slogan imported from the UK).  Attention is being given by 
finance ministries to ways in which co-ordination of related programs which cross agency boundaries 
might be improved.  Symbolic of this new mood is the recent instruction by the Australian Prime Minister 
to all government agencies that they are to abandon the agency-specific logos where were developed over 
recent years and return to using the Australian coat of arms in conjunction with the general descriptor 
‘Australian Government’
15.  There has also been some tightening of Cabinet processes at the 
Commonwealth level to increase oversight of individual agencies, representing a step back from the 
model which dominated the early years of the present administration, under which Cabinet was viewed as 
playing only a broad strategy-setting role. 
 
The Commonwealth had, in fact, taken the independent business model significantly further than the 
States.  One striking aspect of this had been the complete decentralization of banking arrangements, so 
that agencies managed all of there own funds (including appropriation funding) in their own bank 
accounts.  Arising from one of the recommendations of the Budget Estimates and Framework Review, 
this decentralized banking system has now been abolished, with funds now being held centrally by the 
finance ministry and released on an ‘as needs’ basis to agencies. 
 
In respect to the appropriations framework, little has as yet changed.  The AOB appropriations categories 
– output appropriations which include ‘funded’ depreciations; equity injections/loans; and administered expenses – all remain in place throughout the country.  At the Commonwealth level, the Budget Estimates 
and Framework Review did result in the abolition of capital charging, which is now widely viewed as 
having been an administratively cumbersome waste of time.  Nevertheless, significant change in the 
appropriation framework is highly likely over the coming years.  It is of considerable significance in this 
respect that during the Budget Estimates and Framework Review, some within the Finance department 
seriously argued (unsuccessfully at this stage) for a reversion to something like the pre-AOB capital 
expenditure appropriation model. 
 
It is clear, in summary, that accrual output budgeting, as originally articulated, is now dead in Australia, 
even though a number of important elements of the system – particularly its ‘reforms’ of the 
appropriations and financial control system – remain.  What will take its place is, however, unclear at this 
stage.  It may well be that the performance budgeting model of the state of New South Wales – the one 
state which has consistently rejected the AOB philosophy – points the way. 
 
THE NEW SOUTH WALES SYSTEM: A WAY FORWARD? 
NSW is strongly committed to the principle of performance budgeting – that is, to the strengthening of 
the linkage between budgets and results through the systematic use of performance information in the 
budget process.  It is, however, the one Australian state which has consistently rejected the AOB model.  
The NSW Treasury has taken the view that the purchaser-provider model is impracticable, that it “tends 
to focus the attention of both the Executive Government and agencies on outputs, to the possible 
detriment of outcomes”, and that it makes quite unrealistic assumptions about the information available to 
central budget decision-makers.  More broadly, NSW Treasury has rejected the notion that market models 
are the solution to the public budgeting problem, asserting that the absence or weakness of price signals, 




The centerpiece of the NSW approach to performance budgeting is the Service and Resource Allocation 
Agreements (SRAAs).  These are ‘outcome-focused’ agreements, developed on an agency-by-agency 
basis and signed by the Treasurer and the relevant minister. An agency’s SRAA is intended to articulate 
its intended outcomes, strategies and the “level of service delivery it can provide” within its budget.  
Particular emphasis is placed upon the connection between any funding increases and performance 
improvements.  During the budget process, agencies are required to lodge a ‘Draft SRAA’ which outlines 
their performance expectations based upon current funding (on a ‘no policy change’ basis), and a separate 
‘Budget Proposals’ document which contains bids for extra resources together with an indication of the 
performance targets improvements which the agency expects to achieve with those additional resources 
(NSW Treasury, 2002). 
 
The NSW system bears some resemblance to the British Public Service Agreements (PSA) system.  Like 
the SRAAs, the PSAs document negotiated between Treasury and line agencies as part of the budget 
process with the aim of strengthening the link between resources and results.  There is a particular 
emphasis upon ‘tying new resources to new reform and results’ (UK Government 2002: i). 
 
The PSA approach is heavily focused upon performance target-setting, and the great majority of PSA 
targets are now outcome targets.  There are, for example numerical targets for improving the literacy and 
numeracy outcomes of school children, and for reducing mortality rates from heart disease and cancer 
(UK Government 2002a).  Given that outcomes are what matters most, this is in a sense laudable, and 
contrasts favorably with the undue AOB emphasis upon outputs.  However, it is a widely recognized 
characteristic of public management that outcomes are not fully controllable, but are greatly influenced by 
‘contextual factors’ such as unpredictable changes in the external environment or variability in client/case 
characteristics.  Dealing with the unpredictable effects of contextual factors is an important challenge for 
target-setting regimes.  The UK PSA regime has frequently been criticized for setting targets too inflexibly, without making sufficient allowance for the possibility that agencies may not be to blame for 
failure to meet their targets. 
 
By contrast, the NSW SRAA model attempts to systematically take into account the impact of contextual 
factors upon outcomes achieved.  Agencies are required in the preparation of their SRAAs to explicitly 
identify “key risks that may prevent progress being made towards achieving the desired outcome”. Risks 
are appropriately defined as potential event that can either impact on the achievement of desired 
outcomes, or upon the planned delivery of outputs and the contribution that outputs are intended to make 
towards achieving outcomes (NSW Treasury, 2002: 23-26).  To emphasize the point, NSW avoids the 
language of ‘targets’ in respect to outcomes, preferring instead to refer to outcome “estimates of progress” 
(NSW Treasury, 2002: 32). 
 
This risk management approach is only one of a number of ways in which the NSW SRAA approach 
seeks to incorporate sound corporate planning principles.  In this respect also, NSW has learnt from the 
British experience.  A common criticism of the PSA approach, particularly in the early years of the 
system, was that targets tended to become a substitute for, rather than part of, good corporate planning 
(see, e.g. House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2003: 14). 
 
By contrast to the rushed implementation of AOB, the SRAA system has been introduced and extended 
gradually over a number of years.  As at 2003, it covered 12 budget sector agencies responsible for 
approximately 70 percent of the NSW budget.  Ultimately, it will extend to all but the very smallest of 
budget sector agencies. 
 
Although it was the first Australian government to adopt accrual accounting in general government, NSW 
financial reporting and control systems differ substantially from the AOB model, in line with the NSW 
rejection of the purchaser-provider principle.  Budget funding is not characterized as ‘revenue’ and the  
 
bottom line of the agency statements of financial performance reported in the NSW budget papers is not 
the operating result, but rather the ‘net cost of services’ (NCS).  NCS is defined as the total cost of 
services minus retained agency ‘own-source’ agency revenue (e.g. user charges).  Moreover, although the 
reported NCS includes depreciation, there is no pretence of budgeting for depreciation.  The budget 
allocations received by each agency are not for the NCS, but for what is known as the controlled net cost 
of services, which explicitly excludes depreciation (NSW Treasury, 2001).  Accordingly, the traditional 
form of budgetary capital appropriation has been retained. 
 
As other Australian jurisdictions turn away from the AOB model, interest in the NSW approach – and, of 
course, in other international models – can be expected to grow.  It is likely, however, to be a couple of 
years yet before the new direction of performance budgeting in Australia becomes fully clear. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Notwithstanding its laudable objectives, accrual output budgeting in Australia was not a success.   
Although rushed implementation contributed to this, the core problem was the unsuitability of the 
purchaser-provider model for many public outputs.  It is regrettable that the unsatisfactory AOB 
experience has given accrual accounting a bad name amongst many within the Australian public sector. 
 
By 2003, the process of dismantling AOB had started.  Purchaser-provider mechanisms such as the 
national governments’ ‘output pricing reviews’ and ‘purchasing agreements’ had largely disappeared.  
Other problematic elements of the AOB system – particularly in financial reporting and financial control 
– remain.  It is, however, likely that these also will change in coming years. 
 
The future direction of Australian public budgeting is unclear.  Enthusiasm for the core idea of 
performance budgeting – the closer linking of results and resources – will not, however, disappear simply 
because one particular model of performance budgeting has proved disappointing.  The alternative approach taken by the state of NSW may well point to future directions.  Despite the disappointing AOB 
experience, Australian public budgeting systems retain many extremely attractive features, many of which 
had been refined in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Australia continues to offer an attractive model for a 




                                                 
1  As the Victorian Treasury, for example, put it ‘funding will be based on a single quantity and unit cost measure 
for each output.  Major quantity measures should allow a quantity x unit cost = expenditure equation to be derived 
where possible” (Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance, 1997a: 18).  In the Commonwealth’s purchasing 
agreements, the principle took a more sophisticated form which combined fixed cost funding component with per-
unit payments. 
2  Whether producing itself, or via out-sourcing. 
3  Key elements of this structure included: (1) distinction between ‘no policy change’ forward spending projections 
and new policy initiatives, with particular Cabinet attention upon the latter during the budget process; (2) 
considerable freedom for agencies to reallocate spending within their ‘no policy change’ budget base.  This placed 
pressure upon agencies to fund new expenditure initiatives by identifying other savings or low priority areas within 
their own budgets, rather than automatically seeking increased budgets; (3) Cabinet-level Expenditure Review 
Committee (ERC) to lead the priority-determination process, and to strengthen the finance minister in promoting 
fiscal discipline and allocative efficiency; (4) highly selective ERC reviews of sectors of the budget, so as to 
promote inter-agency policy co-ordination and also to ensure that the ‘no policy change’ budget base was 
periodically re-examined in the light of overall priorities.  A good, easily accessible outline of these systems it to be 
found in Campos and Pradhan (1996).  See also Department of Finance (1992). 
4  The election of conservative government in the States from late 1992 and at the Commonwealth level in 1996 put 
these bureaucrats in a position where they could effect these changes.  Nevertheless, it could not be said that the 
AOB system was one to which conservative political leaders themselves had any strong commitment.  
Overwhelmingly, neither they, nor politicians generally, understood the system.  For precisely this reason, AOB 
never became an issue of partisan political controversy. 
5  The main focus of these interviews was the national government.  However, the author also benefited from a 
number of discussions with selected officials in four states.  The interviews were, for obvious reason, generally 
conducted on the basis of non-attribution of specific remarks and information to individuals. 
6  Note that there are interesting multi-year budgeting aspects of this system, which cannot unfortunately be 
discussed here.   
7  As the Western Australian Treasury put it (Accrual Appropriations and Capital User Charge: A User Manual, 
June 2001, p 13). 
8  As is well known, under program budgeting, zero-based budgeting and similar systems, the illusion flourished that 
it was possible for the center to determine detailed expenditure priorities on the basis of an overall expenditure plan 
aimed at maximizing ‘allocative’ efficiency.  Following the failure of those systems, it has been widely accepted by 
budgeters that good allocative decision-making required the right balance between centralization and 
decentralization.  As the World Bank puts it, “programmatic decisions for budget formulation must devolve to line 
ministers”, while the prime focus of the center should be the determination of sectoral expenditure allocations 
(World Bank, 1998: 27). 
9  To take a typical example: “under an output-based management regime, the Government, as funder, decides which 
outputs it will fund, at specified levels of quantity, quality and price” (DTF, 1997b: 11). 
10  Some agency personnel interviewed suggested that an additional reason for the lack of success of benchmarking 
in certain areas were intra-government benchmarking was attempted (e.g. policy advice) was an uncooperative 
stance taken by many government departments to sharing cost data 
11  In essence, the position is that all State government agencies, and the few Commonwealth government agencies 
which have substantial capital budgets, are subject to annual capital expenditure limits which make no distinction  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
between funding from accumulated depreciation and equity injections (see Robinson, 2002a).  The one exception to 
this is Commonwealth agencies which hold few major assets, and which have relatively low levels of capital 
expenditure.  These are generally permitted to control their own capital expenditure to the extent that it is 
‘internally’ funded from funded depreciation.  Because in Australia it is the State governments which are responsible 
for most public infrastructure (e.g. hospitals, schools, roads), this applies to the majority of Commonwealth 
government departments.  Commonwealth departments which are big capital spenders (e.g. the Defense 
Department) have their aggregate capital budgets tightly controlled, just like State government general government 
agencies.  It might be thought that at least in respect to those Commonwealth agencies without major capital budget, 
the AOB capital budgeting arrangements are an improvement.  But even this conclusion would be questionable.  
Prior to the introduction of AOB, the ‘running cost’ system gave Commonwealth agencies included routine funding 
for minor capital works which departments could employ quite flexibly. 
12  ‘Pierpont’ (Trevor Sykes), ‘Try the Economics of Defence for a Really Dingbat Parade’, Australian Financial 
Review, 14 May 2003. 
13  Associated with major personnel changes – in particular, the replacement of the CEO and of the Head of the 
Budget division. 
14 WA Treasury Circular, OBM Implementation - Pilot Exercise, September 2002. 
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